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the capacity to innovate. Yet the reader may think that the opposite 
scenario is currently unfolding, with a strengthening of the state sector, 
the creation of global state-owned champions and a Party that aspires 
to gain absolute control over business, state and civil society as a whole. 
However, one thing is sure: regional and industry variations in busi-
ness–government relations are likely to persist and continue being an 
important research topic. 
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In the shadows of a looming trade war between China and the USA, 
this second edition of Jonathan Fenby's 2014 book Will China Dominate 
the 21st Century? has never been more relevant. With only 154 pages it 
is an easy read that provides a realistic take on China's ability to domi-
nate this coming century. It is an enlightening and engaging book for 
anyone with an interest in China and its current grip on the political 
and economic situation that feeds into the global arena. For the more 
seasoned China scholar the main points may already be well known and 
the book can safely be placed on the shelf as another realist interpreta-
tion of why China will not succeed in having any meaningful impact 
on dominating the global agenda in the twenty-ﬁrst century. 
Looking into China's political setting, Fenby describes Xi Jinping as 
an uncommon man, standing out in a world where strong leadership 
of big economically powerful countries has become a rarity. Xi is por-
trayed as China's new emperor standing at the centre of a personality 
cult, and as 'a leader of a nation that sees itself existing on a plane of its 
own, with little or no need of a global order shared with other nations' 
(p. 18). The return to rule by a single dominant ﬁgure has increased 
the risks inherent in Chinese society, as its leadership style has become 
increasingly totalitarian. The denial of a political role for the people 
provides a negative foundation for its government, bringing with it 
systemic weaknesses which grow in scope as China develops. The 
Communist Party and Xi Jinping have no rivals for power, and while Xi 
has eliminated any form of opposition, Fenby describes this trend as a 
general fetish by Chinese rulers (p. 19). Throughout the Party's history 
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any form of competition or opposition has been stamped out, be it from 
non-governmental organizations, human rights lawyers, websites or 
Nobel Peace Prize winners such as Liu Xiaobo, now in jail for 11 years 
for advocating democracy. 
In relation to the economy, Wen Jibao's four 'uns' – unsustainable, 
uncoordinated, unbalanced and unstable – have been used to describe 
the China's economic condition and its dire needs for reform (p. 63). The 
reluctance of central and local authorities to take the risks that come with 
reform has, however, exacerbated the very problem. A policy to raise 
consumption by increasing wages was seen as one way of rebalancing 
towards consumption, as stated in the Five-Year Plan for 2011–2015. 
Meanwhile, wage rises increase costs, and the higher price of capital is 
eating away at the Deng-era combination of cheap labour and cheap 
savings, with China's ﬁnancial system coming increasingly under strain. 
Upgrading the economy to move further up the value chain could cre-
ate even fewer jobs, replacing workers with machines. If that continues, 
Fenby predicts that two core objectives of government and Party policy 
– to give China a more advanced industrial machine and to preserve jobs 
– will come into conﬂict (p. 87). The shift to innovation is an even more 
difﬁcult challenge in an authoritarian regime: China's growing number 
of patents are proof of this, in their inarguable display of poor quality. 
The government's strong shift to supply side reform is also evidence 
of strong rhetoric rather than hard actions as, in the winter of 2015 for 
example, it clashed with local needs for regime stability by keeping 
empty jobs aﬂoat. Local political considerations therefore 'stand in the 
way of economic efﬁciency in a system in which the Communist Party 
and its cadres at all levels outgun government ofﬁcials and corporate 
managers' (p. 91). As these cases indicate, Li Keqiang's call for reforms 
to combat Wen's four 'uns' cannot rely only on the government to steer 
the economy. China's political and economic situation is, according to 
Fenby, caught in a standoff between its quest for stability and its need 
for economic reform. 
In the meanwhile, money-making has moved to the very centre of 
the way China operates, which in turn has started to breed a new sense 
of individualism, moving China and its people away from an era of 
communist collectivism. China's middle class simply wants more. They 
thirst for clean air, pure water and a clean environment in which to raise 
their kids. Priorities are shifting fast and discontent has been building 
up steadily. Similar problems have been present in now-developed 
nations, but Fenby thinks that they take on a more acute character in 
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China, precisely because of its global ambitions. Rising internal ten-
sions have manifested themselves alongside 150,000 to 180,000 popular 
demonstrations each year, and social media is increasingly used as a 
vent for people's frustrations: 'The system will not implode or explode 
any more than it will collapse economically', Fenby predicts (p. 116). 
And the real danger lies in the way in which the Party has penetrated 
every particle of society so that if one element is disturbed it may send 
treacherous ripples throughout the entire system. 
While China's willingness to provide international aid without strings 
has won it plenty of friends from afar, so its desire to establish itself as a 
geopolitical stakeholder stays incommensurate with its current degree 
of economic prowess. Furthermore, Fenby contends that a regime that 
cannot admit to the uncomfortable facts of its own history and refuses 
to engage in debate on its assumed truths is hardly in a position to gain 
wide international intellectual support (p. 125). China remains captured 
in a paradox where it needs to reform in order to rule more effectively 
but reform brings with it the threat of weakening the very system it 
seeks to protect. The conservation of control lies at the heart of China's 
Communist Party while that very control now seems to run contrary to 
an increased liberalization of its economy and society (p. 128). And this 
is exactly the reason why China will not dominate the global system, 
which it so desperately longs to shape, Fenby concludes.
In his book Fenby has accurately captured China's pending dilemma, 
but his focus on internal political change along with its incommensura-
bility with a liberalized economic system perhaps suffers from a stroke 
of denial, painting too gloomy a picture on the balance between power 
and continued reform. Fenby notes that while the USA has left a legacy 
of a liberalist world order, so China is now pondering about how best 
to leave its own footprint on a new order in which it seeks to have an 
increased say. In the meanwhile, and as Fenby rightly notes, China's 
internal tensions do seem to be a stick in the wheel of the all-powerful 
Party, slowing its ambitions of dominating the twenty-ﬁrst century.      
In the words of Guy de Jonquières, 'China has shown that it can shake 
the established world order. It has yet to show that it can help shape a 
future one'.
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